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THE AFFIRMATIVE ROLE OF STATE COURTS TO
ENJOIN STRIKES IN BREACH OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
LEONARD S. JANOFSKY*
DENNIS H. VAUGHN **
In Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson' the United States Supreme
Court determined that the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act' survived the enactment of Section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Acts and, therefore, that federal courts remained
without jurisdiction to enjoin strikes in violation of labor agreements.
The Sinclair case again left open two questions upon which the
Court had earlier expressly reserved decision in Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney.' Those questions are (1) whether or not the reach
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, when taken together with section 301,
extends to state courts so as to deprive them of jurisdiction to enjoin
strikes in breach of collective bargaining agreements, and (2) assum-
ing that it does not, whether such injunction suits filed in state courts
may be removed to federal courts, where the strictures of Norris-La-
Guardia will control.
The thesis of this article is that state courts retain their histori-
cal jurisdiction to enjoin strikes in violation of labor contracts in suits
falling under section 301 and, further, that such suits filed in state
courts may not be removed to federal courts.
I. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT
At the time of enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act
in 1947, the enforcement of labor contracts rested solely in the hands
of state courts except in cases where federal diversity jurisdiction ex-
isted.' The Norris-LaGuardia Act prevented federal courts from
issuing injunctions in labor disputes,' and no federal statute afforded a
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fornia Bar; Member, American Bar Association; Senior Vice President and Trustee, Los
Angeles County Bar Association; Co-chairman, Committee on "State Labor Legislation"
of the American Bar Association's Section of Labor Relations Law; Member of firm, Paul,
Hastings, Janofsky & Walker.
** A.B., Stanford University, 1955; LL.B., Stanford University, 1957; Member, Cali-
fornia Bar; Member, Los Angeles County and American Bar Associations; Member of firm,
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1 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
2
 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. { 101 (1964).
5 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
4 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
5 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947).
e For a quotation of part of § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia, see p. 877 infra.
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jurisdictional basis for damage claims in federal courts in the absence
of diversity of citizenship.'
The reservation of all authority in state courts to remedy breaches
of labor contracts resulted in an imbalance in the enforcement of such
contracts. This imbalance related to the unavailability to employers of
relief against unions, for in spite of the general state attitude that dam-
ages would be awarded and injunctions granted,' unions could not al-
ways be sued." The diverse common law rules applicable in the various
states presented a procedural rats' nest frequently frustrating all at-
tempts to secure service of process upon and execution of judgment
against union associations." Employers, on the other hand, could be
sued with ease. The result was, of course, a one-sided justice which,
according to the House report supporting the enactment of the Labor
Management Relations Act, was believed to be inequitable, not only
by employers, but also by seventy-five per cent of the individual union
members."
The legislative history of Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act" clearly supports the proposition that Congress' primary
purpose in enacting this statute was to remedy the grotesque imbal-
ance in the availability of judicial relief." There was no attempt and
no intent to remove or restrict state jurisdiction. Instead, the doors of
the federal courts were opened and service of process upon union as-
sociations and execution against their funds was simplified."
The original House bill suggested doing away with the Norris-
LaGuardia injunction restrictions in breach of contract suits, but this
7 See generally the appendix to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 485 (1957), in which is set forth "the entire relevant
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act and its predecessor, the Case Bill." Id. at 462;
see particularly id. at 505-06, 519, 520, 525, 533, 536, 541-42.
8
 Some states have enacted "little Norris-LaGuardia acts." Unlike the federal statute,
however, some such state acts do not prohibit injunctions for strikes in violation of col-
lective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., N.Y. Lab. Law § 807(1)(a); C. D. Perry & Sons,
Inc. v. Robilotto, 39 Misc. 2d 147, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
' S. Rep. No. 105, supra note 5, at 15-17.
10
 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 7, at 487-88, 490-92, 496, 498-99,
503-04, 514, 530, 532, 534, and cases cited therein (appendix to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
dissent).
11 H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1947).
32 Section 301 states in part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
13 S. Rep. No. 105, supra note 5, at 15-17; H.R. Rep. No. 245, supra note 11, at 45-
46 ; S. Min. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 108-10 (1947).
11 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.	 I85(h)-(d) (1964).
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proposal was eliminated in the final bill.' While the conference report
does not state an affirmative reason for the disposal of this provision,
the Supreme Court in Sinclair felt that its removal afforded support
for the view that Congress did not intend to repeal the provisions of
Norris-LaGuardia."
Whatever the congressional attitude toward the granting of in-
junctions in federal courts, the picture created by the legislative his-
tory of section 301 does not depict a Congress restricting the channels
of judicial relief and funneling all activity into the federal forum.
There were no findings in the majority or the minority reports in either
house that a fundamental national interest was being thwarted by
state action. Instead, the framers were motivated by the sole concern
that the federal courts should be opened to afford relief where it could
not otherwise be found.'
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The Supreme Court's interpretation of section 301 in conjunction
with the Norris-LaGuardia Act began with the Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills 18 decision in 1957. In that case the Court made two sig-
nificant determinations: First, that section 301 created an independent
federal substantive law which required federal courts to apply federal
principles;" and second, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not pre-
vent federal courts from compelling arbitration if the labor contract
so provided.'
In 1962 the Supreme Court, in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Court-
ney,' rejected the proposition that section 301 pre-empted state juris-
diction in breach of labor contract suits and held that state jurisdiction
and federal jurisdiction are concurrent." In pointing out that principles
of national labor legislation did not demand exclusive power in the
federal courts to decide the issues, the Court said:
We start with the premise that nothing in the concept of
our federal system prevents state courts from enforcing rights
created by federal law. Concurrent jurisdiction has been a
common phenomenon in our judicial history, and exclusive
federal court jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law
has been the exception rather than the rule."
18
 Compare 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29	 § 185 (1964), with H.R. 3020, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947).
18 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, supra note 1, at 207-09.
17
 See note 13 supra.
18 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
19 Id. at 456-57.
20 Id. at 458-59.
21 Supra note 4.
22 Id. at 507-09.
28 Id. at 507-08.
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With respect to the contention that the language of section 301 deprived
state courts of jurisdiction, the Court referred to the context in which
the section was enacted and noted:
Such a construction of § 301(a) would also disregard the
particularized history behind the enactment of that provision
of the federal labor law. The legislative history makes clear
that the basic purpose of § 301(a) was not to limit, but to
expand, the availability of forums for the enforcement of con-
tracts made by labor organizations." (Emphasis added.)
Lincoln Mills and Dowd Box established fundamental principles
applicable to the interpretation of section 301. The subsequent decisions
of the Court in Teamsters' Local v. Lucas Flour Co. 25 and in Sinclair
were elaborations on the principles earlier established.
In Lucas Flour the Court held that the precise language of the
contractual grievance and arbitration procedure in the labor agreement
there involved implied a prohibition of strikes, and, therefore, that the
union violated the contract by calling a strike. The Court emphasized
the problems that might arise from a lack of uniformity between
federal and state courts in the interpretation of contract terms, stating:
The possibility that individual contract terms might have
different meanings under state and federal law would inevita-
bly exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and
administration of collective agreements."
The Court continued:
The importance of the area which would be affected by sepa-
rate systems of substantive law makes the need for a single
body of federal law particularly compelling. The ordering
and adjusting of competing interests through a process of
free and voluntary collective bargaining is the keystone of
the federal scheme to promote industrial peace. State law
which frustrates the effort of Congress to stimulate the
smooth functioning of that process thus strikes at the very
core of federal labor policy. With due regard to the many
factors which bear upon competing state and federal interests
in this area, [citations omitted] we cannot but conclude that
in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor
law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules. 27
(Emphasis added.)
24
 Id. at 508-09.
25 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
28 Id. at 103.
27 Id. at 104.
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Therefore, the Court in Lucas Flour held that the application of
federal principles of suestantive law in matters of contract interpreta-
tion was required in state court actions falling within the scope of
section 301 in order to protect against potential conflicts between
federal and state courts and to eliminate state laws that frustrate the
promotion of industrial peace.
Sinclair determined that the grant of federal jurisdiction in section
301 did not include jurisdiction to enjoin the breach of a labor contract.
In reaching this decision, the Court resolved the apparent conflict
between the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and section 301. 28 Feeling itself circumscribed by what it regarded as
a clear expression of congressional intent that Norris-LaGuardia should
stand, the Court refused to engage in an "accommodation" of the two
statutes, as urged by the dissent. 29 In essence, then, the true import of
the Sinclair decision concerns the scope of the legislative grant of
jurisdiction to the federal courts. In no way did the Court indicate
that federal jurisdictional standards apply to the state courts.
III. STATE COURT JURISDICTION
As the Supreme Court's decisions in the cases discussed, particu-
larly Sinclair, make abundantly clear, it is the congressional intent
that must control the question of whether the state courts retain
plenary jurisdiction in breach of contract suits, including jurisdiction
to enjoin strikes in violation of labor contracts.
There is absolutely nothing in the Sinclair case which undermines
the underlying congressional objective of enhancing the enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements through section 301. The Court
there held only that, while section 301 opened the federal courts to
non-injunction actions, it did not at the same time repeal the Norris-
LaGuardia Act by granting federal courts jurisdiction in injunction
matters. Sinclair, thus, did not have the effect of removing any jurisdic-
tion or remedy that had theretofore existed.
It is clear from the face of the Norris-LaGuardia Act that Con-
gress never intended its anti-injunction prohibitions to apply in state
courts. It is equally clear from the legislative history of section 301
that Congress did not intend by its enactment, either directly or in-
directly, to extend Norris-LaGuardia to the states, or to eliminate or
restrict any previously existing state court jurisdiction. In the Senate
debates in 1946, Senator Ferguson stated:
Mr. Ferguson. Mr. President, there is nothing whatever
in the now-being-considered amendment which takes away
28 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, supra note 1, at 196, 216.
29 Id. at 215.
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from the State courts all the present rights of the State courts
to adjudicate the rights between parties in relation to labor
agreements. The amendment merely says that the Federal
courts shall have jurisdiction. It does not attempt to take
away the jurisdiction of the State courts, and the mere fact
that the Senator and I disagree does not change the effect of
the amendment.
Mr. Murray. But it authorizes the employers to bring
suit in the Federal courts, if they so desire.
Mr. Ferguson. That is correct. That is all it does. It
takes away no jurisdiction of the State courts."
The Supreme Court has already explicitly recognized this dear
congressional intent. In the Dowd Box case the Court declared:
The legislative history of the enactment nowhere suggests
that, contrary to the clear import of the statutory language,
Congress intended in enacting § 301(a) to deprive a party to
a collective bargaining contract of the right to seek redress
for its violation in an appropriate state tribunal.
In considering these provisions of the proposed legisla-
tion in 1946, Congress manifested its complete awareness of
both the existence and the limitations of state court remedies
for violation of collective agreements.
The clear implication of the entire record of the con-
gressional debates in both 1946 and 1947 is that the purpose
of conferring jurisdiction upon the federal district courts was
not to displace, but to supplement, the thoroughly considered
jurisdiction of the courts of the various States over contracts
made by labor organizations.
. . . [The entire tenor of the 1947 legislative history
confirms that the purpose of § 301, like its counterpart in the
Case bill, was to fill the gaps in the jurisdictional law of some
of the States, not to abolish existing state court jurisdictional
Consequently, if the Norris-LaGuardia Act were to be extended to
state courts, the congressional purpose, as recognized by the Supreme
Court, would be thoroughly undermined. This would be true whether
Norris-LaGuardia was itself extended or whether the Court declared
that federal labor policy requires that the act's principles be applied in
state courts. Unlike Sinclair, the effect would not simply be that prior
statutory restrictions on the issuance of injunctions would remain;
rather, these restrictions would be drastically extended. Clearly, that
88
 92 Cong. Rec. 5708 (1946).
81 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, supra note 4, at 507, 510, 511, 512.
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conclusion would work at direct cross purposes with the intent of
Congress.
Some commentators urge, however, that uniformity is the "be all
and end all" and must prevail over all other considerations.' The
spectre of alleged conflict between federal and state authorities seems
to send these writers into paroxysms of fear. All too frequently, how-
ever, the concept of uniformity is applied without thought as to the
reasons for its importance, and the nature of the potential conflict and
the dangers it may create are not defined. The reason for uniformity in
this context is to effectuate the national labor policy of promoting
industrial peace through the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements. An examination of the principles which led to the enact-
ment of Norris-LaGuardia shows that these principles have little ap-
plication in breach of contract cases. That legislation was enacted
because of .the excessive zeal of federal courts in granting injunctions
which impeded strikes, picketing and boycotts by labor unions for the
purpose of self-organization and collective bargaining." As was noted
in Lucas Flour, "The ordering and adjusting of competing interests
through a process of free and voluntary collective bargaining is the
keystone of the federal scheme to promote industrial peace." 34 The
grant of an injunction prior to the bargaining process defeats this
purpose; the grant of an injunction to enforce the contract after the
process is completed, however, offers the best means of making the
bargaining effective. Accordingly, to deprive state courts of their
traditional jurisdiction to issue injunctions against strikes in breach of
labor contracts, rather than having the effect of promoting industrial
peace, would, on the contrary, affirmatively frustrate the achievement
of the expressed national objective."
Furtheimore, it must be re-emphasized that the primary fear in
Lucas Flour concerned the danger inherent in state courts reaching
opposing views in areas where their jurisdiction overlapped with that
of the federal courts.a° Accordingly, uniformity should not mean that
in areas outside the scope of the grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts state courts cannot act. As Justice (now Chief Justice) Traynor
of the California Supreme Court observed in McCarroll v. Los Angeles
County Dist. of Carpenters:
Finally, there is no invariable requirement, implicit in
the federal system, that a state court enforcing a federal right
82 E.g., Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Ques-
tions, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1027 (1963).
88
 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1964). See also Frankfurter & Greene, The
Labor Injunction (1930).
34
 Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., supra note 25, at 104.
85 Id. at 104-05.
38 Ibid.
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must not go beyond the remedies available in a federal court.
Uniformity in the determination of the substantive federal
right itself is no doubt a necessity, but such uniformity is not
threatened because a state court can give a more complete
and effective remedy."
The concern expressed in Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in the
Sinclair case that injunction suits will be channeled to the state courts
and, therefore, that it will be those courts rather than federal courts
which will be enunciating federal labor policy, is not well founded. It
certainly cannot be assumed that the state courts are either unwilling
to apply or incapable of interpreting federal labor policy. Indeed, one
wonders why there is any concern on this score in light of Justice
Traynor's learned treatment of the issue in the McCarroll case. The
Supreme Court has also made it clear that, to insure uniformity, it will
retain the final word on these issues whether determined initially in
the federal courts or in the state courts." In the language of the Court:
"[D]iversities and conflicts" may occur, no less among
the courts of the eleven federal circuits, than among the
courts of the several States, as there evolves in this field of
labor management relations that body of federal common law
of which Lincoln Mills spoke. But this not necessarily un-
healthy prospect is no more than the usual consequence of the
historic acceptance of concurrent state and federal jurisdic-
tion over cases arising under federal law. 39
To have it otherwise would result in the complete evisceration of the
already shrunken body of state authority over labor relations.
These views are fully supported by the McCarroll decision:"
In his remarkable opinion, Justice Traynor perceptively anticipated
the Supreme Court's later decisions in Dowd Box, Lucas Flour and
Sinclair. He held that neither the Norris-LaGuardia Act nor any other
federal labor law deprives the state courts of their jurisdiction in in-
junction actions against strikes in breach of labor contracts, declaring:
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
does not embody any policy that requires a state court en-
forcing rights created by that section to withhold injunctive
relief. The principal purpose of section 301 was to facilitate
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements by
making unions suable as entities in the federal courts, and
87 49 Cal. 2d 45, 64, 315 P.2d 322, 332-33 (1957).
88 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, supra note 4, at 514.
89
 Ibid.
40 McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist, of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322
(1957).
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thereby to remedy the one-sided character of existing labor
legislation. (See United Packinghouse Workers v. Wilson
& Co., (N.D. Ill.), 80 F. Supp. 563, 568.) We would give
altogether too ironic a twist to this purpose if we held that
the actual effect of the legislation was to abolish in state
courts equitable remedies that had been available, and leave
an employer in a worse position in respect to the effective
enforcement of his contract than he was before the enactment
of section 301."
Since Sinclair, a well-reasoned decision of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Shaw Elec. Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers'
has also reached the conclusion that the states remain free to enjoin
strikes in breach of collective bargaining agreements. In that decision
the court relied upon the congressional intent "that suits for breach of
such agreements should remain wholly private, and 'be left to the
usual processes of the law',"" which would include state court injunc-
tions. Further, the court was of the opinion that the Lucas Flour
decision did not go beyond the necessity for uniform application of
federal substantive principles in the interpretation of contractual
clauses."
IV. REMOVAL
Assuming that state courts retain their jurisdiction to enjoin
strikes in breach of collective bargaining agreements, the question
remains whether such suits filed in state courts may nevertheless be
removed to the federal courts where, of course, the anti-injunction
provisions of Norris-LaGuardia will govern. Stated in another manner,
in practical effect does the Norris-LaGuardia Act, in conjunction with
section 301 and the removal provisions of the federal Judicial Code,
achieve indirectly what it does not achieve directly—that is, strip
state courts of their traditional right to grant injunctions against
strikes in breach of contract?
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent in-
junction in any case involving or growing out of any labor
dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or
interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined)
from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following
acts:
41 Id. at 63-64, 315 P.2d at 332.
42
 208 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1965).
43 Id. at 773.
44 Id. at 774-75.
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(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to re-
main in any relation of employment...." (Emphasis added.)
Section 1441 of the Judicial Code, relating to removal of actions from
state to federal courts, provides:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which
the district courts of the United States have original jurisdic-
tion, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants,
to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.
. . ." (Emphasis added.)
Precisely then, the issue is whether or not the federal courts, being
without "jurisdiction" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, are therefore
without "original jurisdiction" under section 1441 and so must remand
such suits to the state courts.
As heretofore noted, the Supreme Court did not reach this ques-
tion in the Sinclair case and specifically reserved decision thereon in
Dowd Box." The Sinclair case does, however, provide support for the
proposition that the federal courts must remand such cases. Thus, the
majority there held that "the District Court was correct in dismissing
Count 3 [for an injunction] of petitioner's complaint for lack of juris-
diction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act."" And in Mr. Justice Bren-
nan's dissenting opinion, in which Justices Douglas and Harlan joined,
it was stated that if Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act "is to be
read literally, removal will not be allowed!'"
15 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
46 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
47 In
 Dowd Box the Court commented on this issue:
And quite obviously we have not yet considered the various problems concerning
removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. See Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Work-
ers, 177 F. Supp. 511; Fay v. American CystoscoPe Makers, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 278.
368 U.S. at 514 n.8. The Court's selection of decisions for citation is interesting. In
the Swift case plaintiff prayed both for damages and an injunction, predicated upon a
strike in breach of contract. In considering the very issue here presented, it was held that
the cause of action wherein an injunction was requested would be remanded if the com-
plaint were amended so as to state separate causes of action for an injunction and dam-
ages. The Fay case, on the other hand, considered only § 301 and § 1441 without regard
to Norris-LaGuardia. In denying remand, it was there held that, in light of § 301, the
defendant could not be compelled to litigate a federal claim in a state court. To the extent
that the district court thereby implied that there was not concurrent jurisdiction between
state and federal courts in § 301 suits, its rationale is contrary to the subsequent decision
of the Supreme Court in Dowd Box.
48 370 U.S. at 215 (emphasis added).
413 Id. at 227 and n.21. It is significant that the congressional statement of public
policy in the Norris-LaGuardia Act is also expressed in terms of "jurisdiction." Section 2
provides in part:
In the interpretation of this chapter and in determining the jurisdiction and
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The only United States court of appeals decision on this issue
since the Sinclair case is American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Int'l
Operating Eng'rs. 5° In a most thoroughly considered discussion of the
question, the Third Circuit held that a suit commenced in a state court
to enjoin a strike in breach of a collective bargaining agreement did
not fall within section 1441 and, therefore, that the district court erred
in denying the motion to remand. While there were several predicates
for the decision, the court concluded, in reliance upon substantial deci-
sional authority, that jurisdiction within the meaning of section 1441
means the power to entertain the suit, consider the merits and render a
binding decision, and that since the Norris-LaGuardia Act precluded
this, the suit should be remanded."
The federal district courts subsequent to Sinclair but prior to
American Dredging reached differing conclusions on this point.' In
accord with American Dredging is Merchants Refrigerating Co. v.
Warehouse Union;" to the contrary is Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery
Drivers."
Certainly, the type of convoluted analysis that would find the
existence of "original jurisdiction" under section 1441 in order to
turn around and dismiss for lack of "jurisdiction" under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act must, be rejected as being completely incongruous.
Attempts by some to answer this compelling conclusion suggest that
even though the plaintiff restricts his prayer to injunctive relief, the
federal courts may nevertheless have jurisdiction to grant other relief
authority of the courts of the United States, as such jurisdiction and authority are
defined and limited in this chapter, the public policy of the United States is de-
clared as follows:
. . . . [T]herefore, the following definitions of and limitations upon the
jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United States are enacted.
47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).
5° 338 F.2d 837 (3rd Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
t 1 Id. at 840-42.
62
 The great weight of decisions prior to Sinclair ordered remand. American Dredging
Co. v. Local 25, Int'l Operating Eng'rs, supra note 50, at 839-40 n.8; see, e.g., National
Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Heffernan, 195 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
53
 213 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
54 228 F. Supp. 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). Inapposite are H. A. Lott, Inc. v. Hoisting &
Portable Eng'rs, 222 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1963), and Crestwood Dairy, Inc. v. Kelley,
222 F. Supp. 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), wherein the complaints prayed for both an injunction
and damages. Such cases present additional removal problems under § 1441(c) of the
Judicial Code which provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would
be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-
removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the
district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand
all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964). These additional problems are beyond
the scope of this article.
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pursuant to Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
These suggestions, however, overlook the fact that jurisdiction must be
determined from the allegations of the complaint. The question is not
whether the court has jurisdiction over the case as the plaintiff might
have alleged it; rather, the question is whether the court has jurisdic-
tion over the case as plaintiff did allege it." Furthermore, as the court
noted in disposing of this contention in American Dredging," Rule 82
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribes that such rules
"shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United
States district courts.'" 8
Arguments based upon esoteric, conceptual, or theoretical inter-
pretations of the elusive word "jurisdiction" must not be permitted to
obscure the paramount issue: congressional intent. The issue is one of
interpretation of federal statutes and, as the Court in Sinclair made
clear, the intent of Congress must control. As above noted, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction in injunction
cases involving labor disputes and, absent diversity of citizenship,
there was no jurisdiction in the federal courts over other actions for
violations of collective bargaining agreements. Thus, it was not until
the enactment of section 301 that the federal courts were vested with
original jurisdiction in non-injunction suits involving strikes in breach
55 See Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery Drivers, supra note 54, at 721 n.3; Aaron, supra
note 32, at 1045-46. Rule 54(c) provides in part:
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.
50 Merchants Refrigerating Co. v. Warehouse Union, supra note 53, at 178.
57 338 F.2d at 848.
58 In addition to his disregard of the above considerations, the alternative courses of
action which Professor Aaron claims are open to the federal court in such cases are highly
questionable both on legal and practical grounds. Aaron, supra note 32, at 1045-46. He
contends, for example, that "clearly, [the federal court] can order the union to arbitrate
the dispute." If by "the dispute" Professor Aaron means the dispute underlying the strike,
obviously this alternative affords no "relief" to which the plaintiff is "entitled" on his
causes of action under rule 54(c). If, on the other hand, Professor Aaron is referring to
arbitration of the plaintiff's causes of action, such claims could not be submitted to arbi-
tration where, as is often the case, labor contracts prescribe a one-sided grievance and
arbitration procedure available only to the processing of claims against the employer. See
the companion case to Sinclair, Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241-45 (1962).
Another of Professor Aaron's suggestions is that the court could grant the plaintiff a
declaratory judgment that the strike is in breach of contract. While such a remedy—if,
indeed, it can be called that—would as a practical matter be a patently hollow one, even
that remedy would not be available under a complaint limited to injunctive relief and not
containing the allegations necessary to support such a judgment. See Sinclair Ref. Co. v.
Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312, 320 (7th Cir. 1961). Finally, as to Professor Aaron's alternative
that the court could award damages, the plaintiff would not in any event be "entitled"
to "relief" in the form of monetary damages within the meaning of rule 54(c) absent proof
of the same, which proof, of course, is not a prerequisite to obtaining an injunction. This
is to say nothing of the fact that the forms of "relief" suggested by Professor Aaron are
hardly commensurate—either in terms of the employer's interest or our national labor
policy—to an order bringing the illegal strike to an end.
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of labor agreements." If, therefore, it were to be held that, despite
Norris-LaGuardia, the federal courts have "original jurisdiction" of
injunction actions within the meaning of section 1441, then it would be
section 301 that would prohibit remand. Clearly, however, such a result
must be rejected since it would reduce, not enhance, the remedies
available to promote industrial peace by the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements and would eliminate the long standing juris-
diction of state courts to grant injunctions in such cases—an effect
diametrically opposed to the intent of Congress in enacting section 301.
59
 Another and independent question concerning removal which is beyond the scope
of this article is whether a suit to enjoin a strike in breach of contract is "founded on a
claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States . . ."
by virtue of the enactment of § 301. 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964).
Conflicting conclusions have been reached on this question. In the American Dredging
case, one independent ground for the decision was that the action therein was not founded
on such a claim or right. 338 F.2d at 843-46. Contra, National Dairy Prods. Corp.
v. Heffernan, supra note 52, at 154-55.
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